“In contrast to Hitler, Stalin had all the resources needed to overrun Germany and all of Europe in a real blitzkrieg. Stalin had militarized the economy. Hitler had not. Stalin had prepared the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air force only for offensive operations. The army had not been trained how to retreat…”
Germany’s War, Chapter 4: The Allied Conspiracy to Instigate & Prolong WWII
The fourth chapter of John Wear’s book, Germany’s War is now posted. The evidence is overwhelming that it was Roosevelt and Churchill who were determined to have war with Germany and not Germany who wanted war with the Anglo-Saxons.
Hitler made many peace overtures to the British government both before and after he conquered France and drove the British out of Europe. On August 14, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, Hitler called his field marshals into the Chancellery and told them that victory over Britain must not lead to the collapse of the British Empire. Hitler told them that
“Germay is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be Germany, but Japan in the east, Russia in India, Italy in the Mediterranean, and America in world trade. This is why peace is possible with Britain—but not so long as Churchill is prime minister. Thus we must see what the Luftwaffe can do, and wait a possible general election.”
It was Churchill’s determination to keep the war going that destroyed the British Empire.
I have reread Viktor Suvorov’s book, The Chief Culprit, published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press in 2008. Suvorov believes that Stalin is responsible for WWII by encouraging, even luring, Hitler into moves that would put Germany at war with Britain and France. Stalin had long planned to take advantage of Europe at war when his massive and fresh armies would dominate the field.
In June, 1941, both Hitler and Stalin had assembled on their border large armies for invasion. Stalin’s army was many times larger and much better armed than Hitler’s which Suvorov reports had resources for only two months of war. Stalin knew that German forces were assembled on the border. Stalin had excellent intelligence, and it was the excellence of his intelligence that resulted in the Soviet army being caught off guard. Stalin knew that Hitler had assembled troops but lacked the material resources that he needed to support an invasion of Russia. He assumed that Hitler and his generals were rational [or fearful?] and would not attack until they were properly prepared.
In contrast to Hitler, Stalin had all the resources needed to overrun Germany and all of Europe in a real blitzkrieg. Stalin had militarized the economy. Hitler had not. Stalin had prepared the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air force only for offensive operations. The army had not been trained how to retreat. The high speed Soviet tanks were designed for the roads of Western Europe, not for use in the mud, snow, and ice of Russia. Everything Suvorov has uncovered about the Soviet armed forces proves it was assembled for an invasion of Western Europe, which if the Soviets had struck first would have been successful.
The forward positions of the German and Soviet armies made them vulnerable to whoever struck first. As the Germans were not prepared, Stalin was convinced the initiative would be his. In forward position, there are no defense positions. All the ammunition and weapons are on the border. There is no time to move anything or to fall back.
Suvorov believes that Hitler knew Stalin was about to attack and struck first. In contrast David Irving reports that Hitler said that if he had known of the size of the Soviet army, the superiority of its weapon systems, and the Soviet ability to turn out far more and better tanks, cannon, and aircraft than Germany, he would not have attacked.
My conclusion at this time is that Suvorov is correct that Stalin was on the verge of invading Western Europe which required only the defeat of Germany, whose armed forces were greatly outclassed by those of Stalin. By striking first Hitler captured the vast stockpiles of offensive weapons and entire Soviet armies prepared for offensive, not defensive war, and thereby prevented the Soviet conquest and occupation of Western Europe from which no Normandy invasion could possibly have dislodged them.
Hitler attacked unprepared because he believed the war would only last 3 months, which gave him two months to come up with the resources for the third month. I don’t see the evidence that Hitler knew he was about to be attacked*. And it is certain that the British and Americans had no inkling of Stalin’s plan to conquer Western Europe.
It is a paradox that it is the demonized Hitler who saved Western Europe from communism, and it is ironic that the British and Americans were so incompetent that they were focused on the German non-threat and not on the Soviet threat.
It seems clear enough that both Wear and Suvorov are correct. World War II was caused by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, not by Hitler.
(Republished from PaulCraigRoberts.org by permission of author or representative)
*Editor’s Comment: With the greatest respect, I believe Paul Craig Roberts is being circumspect in his statement: “I don’t see the evidence that Hitler knew he was about to be attacked.” Perhaps the words “sufficient” and “yet” might have been useful clarifiers. Adolf Hitler knew that Josef Stalin was about to attack all of Europe, and this is why Hitler attacked the Soviet Union first. Viktor Suvorov makes this clear in his book The Chief Culprit, and John Wear makes this clear in Chapter One of Germany’s War.
However, WWII is an extremely challenging subject. As Paul Craig Roberts stated in the prior chapter review:
“A couple of readers corrected me about Hitler’s march into Russia. The German invasion of Russia was not a folly, they said. It saved Europe from Soviet conquest. The readers said that Hitler had no choice as Germany was faced with Soviet invasion. Their contention seemed implausible to me.”
It no longer seems so implausible to many readers, and that is the purpose of Germany’s War, to bring history into accord with the facts, without fear or favor of the ‘narrative’.