“…The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.”
Germany conspired with the other Axis Powers to start World War II.
No confirmation has ever been found in German archives that Germany conspired to instigate World War II. The Axis powers also never had a clear-cut plan for achieving world domination. Gen. George Marshall points out in a report titled The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific that there was never close cooperation among the Axis powers. Marshall’s report, which was published after the war, was based on American intelligence reports and interviews with captured German commanders. Marshall’s report contains the following statements:
No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan….
When Italy entered the war Mussolini’s strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshal Keitel reveals that Italy’s declaration of war was contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired….
Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea and air forces in the Far East.
In the absence of anything so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan….
Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord. The Axis as a matter of fact existed on paper only.
Hitler confirms the lack of military coordination between Germany and Italy in his Testament. Hitler states:
Even while they proved themselves incapable of maintaining their positions in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw themselves, without seeking our advice and without even giving us previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless campaign in Greece. The shameful defeats which they suffered caused certain of the Balkan States to regard us with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere else, are to be found the causes of Yugoslavia’s stiffening attitude and her volte-face in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the presence of any of our troops would have been quite unnecessary.
British historian A. J. P. Taylor states that Hitler was not intending or anticipating a major war, much less pursuing a clear-cut plan for achieving world domination in coordination with the Axis powers:
He was not projecting a major war; hence it did not matter that Germany was not equipped for one. Hitler deliberately ruled out the “rearmament in depth” which was pressed on him by his technical advisors. He was not interested in preparing for a long war against the Great Powers. He chose instead “rearmament in width”—a frontline army without reserves, adequate only for a quick strike. Under Hitler’s direction, Germany was equipped to win the war of nerves—the only war he understood and liked; she was not equipped to conquer Europe…In considering German armament we escape from the mystic regions of Hitler’s psychology and find an answer in the realm of fact. The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.
 Marshall, George C., General Marshall’s Report—The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific. Published for the War Department in cooperation with the Council on Books in Wartime, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 1-3. Quoted in Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 351.
 Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 46-47.
 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 217-218.