“…The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.”
The Lie:
Germany conspired with the other Axis Powers to start World War II.
The Truth:
No confirmation has ever been found in German archives that Germany conspired to instigate World War II. The Axis powers also never had a clear-cut plan for achieving world domination. Gen. George Marshall points out in a report titled The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific that there was never close cooperation among the Axis powers. Marshall’s report, which was published after the war, was based on American intelligence reports and interviews with captured German commanders. Marshall’s report contains the following statements:
No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan….
When Italy entered the war Mussolini’s strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshal Keitel reveals that Italy’s declaration of war was contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired….
Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea and air forces in the Far East.
In the absence of anything so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan….
Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord. The Axis as a matter of fact existed on paper only.[1]
Hitler confirms the lack of military coordination between Germany and Italy in his Testament. Hitler states:
Even while they proved themselves incapable of maintaining their positions in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw themselves, without seeking our advice and without even giving us previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless campaign in Greece. The shameful defeats which they suffered caused certain of the Balkan States to regard us with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere else, are to be found the causes of Yugoslavia’s stiffening attitude and her volte-face in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the presence of any of our troops would have been quite unnecessary.[2]
British historian A. J. P. Taylor states that Hitler was not intending or anticipating a major war, much less pursuing a clear-cut plan for achieving world domination in coordination with the Axis powers:
He was not projecting a major war; hence it did not matter that Germany was not equipped for one. Hitler deliberately ruled out the “rearmament in depth” which was pressed on him by his technical advisors. He was not interested in preparing for a long war against the Great Powers. He chose instead “rearmament in width”—a frontline army without reserves, adequate only for a quick strike. Under Hitler’s direction, Germany was equipped to win the war of nerves—the only war he understood and liked; she was not equipped to conquer Europe…In considering German armament we escape from the mystic regions of Hitler’s psychology and find an answer in the realm of fact. The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.[3]
ENDNOTES
[1] Marshall, George C., General Marshall’s Report—The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific. Published for the War Department in cooperation with the Council on Books in Wartime, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 1-3. Quoted in Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 351.
[2] Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 46-47.
[3] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 217-218.
WEARS WAR has moved to a new website! 
Reblogged this on Tommy Roberts and commented:
Is it possible Adolf Hitler was simply more concerned with defending Germany’s sovereign right to Self-Determination than conquering the world for some megalomaniacal tribal agenda?
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Reading Adolf’s secretary’s book written long after, Adolf intended no war she writes, which of course real history confirms. Adolf was a little naive when it came to the Brits and their game.
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I think it’d be more accurate to say he remained so completely devoted to the Germanic peoples, that he could not have expected them to act contrary to his wishes.
The word ‘naive’, which is defined as a lack of experience/wisdom, doesn’t quite cut it. Hitler was rich in experiences, possessing incredible analytical ability (as seen in his assessment of peoples in Mein Kampf and in his specialty as an orator), and capable of speaking as if he were living in the shoes of other Germans. As Kubizek put it, “He knew nothing other than this people.”
Hitler recognized Luther’s mistake as naivety, “too much studying ruined his vision”, a quality which he did not himself share.
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1. Churchill had some sort of relationship with Mussolini; one account notes that Churchill’s first act after losing election in Britain, post-war, was to make tacks for the Swiss Alps, where Mussolini is said to have hidden documents between himself and Il Duce.
2. Mussolini’s Jewish mistress, who fled Italy “in the face of mounting antisemitism” — leaving the Italian leader’s Italian lover to hang with him, returned to Italy shortly after hostilities “in order to secure Mussolini’s documents.”
3. According to Andrew Buchanan, https://www.c-span.org/video/?322137-1/discussion-us-engagement-italy-world-war-ii
FDR called Gen. Mark Clark to Bernard Baruch’s plantation in North Carolina to instruct Clark (whose mother is Jewish) to ignore British plans for joint invasion of Rome and take the Eternal City for USA, which he did and which enraged Churchill. IOW, Rome and therefore Italy and therefore control of Mediterranean were trophies over which the British and US fought each the other.
SO — Is there information/evidence that Churchill schemed with Mussolini to take Italy into Greece precisely to disrupt German momentum, and also with the possibility of Italy gaining British favor in the Mediterranean competition?
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Reblogged this on Remember The 14 Words.
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